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ABSTRACT
This article surveys the work of  Denise Riley (b. 1948) from roughly 
1975-1985, reading her prose and poetry alongside each other. The aim 
is twofold: first, to provide an adequate account of  the interconnections 
between Riley’s prose, poetry, and political work, which has not been 
done adequately to date; second, to situate this portrait in terms of  
the social stakes of  literary, anti-capitalist, and feminist politics and 
pedagogies. Read together, her early prose and poetry trace what she 
calls a ‘socialized biology’ at the heart of  poetic and political language. 
Riley’s work provides strategies for interrupting the traditional view of  
poetry as pre-political moral training.
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This article surveys the work of  Denise Riley (b. 1948) from roughly 
1975–1985, paying close attention to the formal textures of  her prose 
and poetry alongside the political and personal contexts that occasioned 
these writings and the ways in which Riley intervened in them. Work on 
Denise Riley as a poet, even a ‘feminist’ poet, has tended to miss the ac-
tual texture of  her critical writings in their political moorings, and work 
on Riley as a feminist theorist has tended simply to note her status as a 
‘poet’ to explain away the peculiarities of  her prose. But her prose is not 
generically ‘poetic’ – it is tirelessly discursive in a manner that crosses 
with lyric, well beyond any vague notion of  what ‘poetic language’ might 
sound like, in its investigation and deployment of  aphorisms and slogans 
and in its serious play with personal pronouns. The poetry and prose 
seem to stem from the same set of  questions and concerns, even as they 
each take different kinds of  responsibilities and linguistic approaches to 
them.1 In this article, I undertake a reading of  the lyric work with the 
critical work, opening up each part of  the oeuvre to a depth that work 
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on Riley in feminist and literary studies has generally neglected. Read 
together, I argue, her early prose and poetry trace what she calls a ‘social-
ized biology’ at the heart of  poetic and political language.
My aim is twofold: first, I want to provide an adequate account of  the 
interconnections between Riley’s prose, poetry, and political work, which 
I do not believe has been done adequately to date. Second, I seek to situ-
ate this portrait in terms of  the social stakes of  literary, anti-capitalist, 
and feminist politics and pedagogies. Riley’s work provides strategies for 
interrupting the traditional view of  poetry as pre-political moral train-
ing. The result, I argue, is the effective disruption of  the prevalent idea 
that some literary ‘morality’ connects culture to politics – precisely be-
cause Riley’s two modes of  writing from this period are, once brought 
together, so difficult to separate.
‘The Force of Circumstance’
In her 1983 War in the Nursery: Theories of  the Child and Mother, Riley 
sought to understand how developmental psychology, psychoanalysis, 
state social policies, wartime economics, employers’ production needs, 
and feminist and socialist organizing intersected around the rapid rise 
and fall of  municipal nurseries in and after the Second World War in 
Britain. Riley’s interest in this question sprang, in large part, from her 
own experiences as a single mother with broadly socialist commitments 
active in the women’s movement in the 1970s and 1980s. The problem 
that animated Riley’s work can be stated in a relatively straightforward 
way even as its implications open into a web of  conceptual and affective 
tangles: how to articulate the needs of  single working mothers under 
late capitalism, without re-entrenching the ideology of  motherhood as a 
fixed role separate from the gender-neutral ‘worker’ or ‘citizen.’ Riley’s 
concluding remarks may sound somewhat simple: ‘My conviction is that 
... there can be no version of  ”motherhood” as such which can be deployed 
to construct a radical politics’ (Riley, 1983: 196). But what gets her to 
this point is a rather tremendous heap of  historical and theoretical mate-
rial, all in order to understand how various discourses, ideologies, and 
material circumstances intertwined, in the period in question, to produce 
the figure of  a ‘mother’ that ‘effectively rendered invisible the needs of  
those working women with children’ (Riley, 1983: 7). Riley begins with 
a chapter on ‘Biology, Psychology and Gender in Socialist and Feminist 
Thinking’ in which she points to the need in socialist-feminist praxis to 
interrogate the categories of  the biological and the social:
[T]here is a need, in the often painful gap between the body politic and 
the individual body, for an idea of  a socialised biology. This would speak 
to problems adumbrated in slogans like ‘the right to choose’, ‘the right to 
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sexual self-determination’ ‘control of  one’s own body’ — the language of  
campaigns concerning abortion and contraception, welfare and population 
policies, or asserting sexual categories.  The idea of  a socialised biology 
would also join broader questions about human capacities and wants, 
growth, illness, ageing; and, instead of  holding these at the margins of  
socialism, would set them at the centre of  its ethical nerve.  At the same 
time, I want to illustrate ways in which the history of  psychology has in 
fact worked against this kind of  development, sometimes by acting as an 
inadequate representation of  socialised biology. (Riley, 1983: 8-9)
The following chapters of  Riley’s book do just that, moving through 
the literature on developmental psychology that depicts the infant as 
progressing from biological animality to social ‘humanity’ (Chapter 2), 
understandings in child psychology of  the basic needs of  infants (par-
ticularly Kleinian theories of  infantile aggression — Chapter 3), the 
‘popularization’ of  these ideas in Bowlby’s theory of  ‘maternal depriva-
tion’ (Chapter 4), how these psychological theories figured in policies on 
wartime nurseries alongside other ideologies and material factors (Chap-
ter 5), and finally, in Chapter 6, the rise of  postwar pronatalism and its 
relation to various sectors of  the state, employers’ demands, socialist and 
feminist politics, and the continually mounting address to an isolated fig-
ure of  ‘the mother.’ I will return to some of  these points in more detail 
later.
While War in the Nursery, the book version of  her PhD thesis in Phi-
losophy from the University of  Sussex, is an impersonal academic study, 
Riley concurrently wrote a number of  short prose pieces for feminist 
and socialist newsletters and journals that supplemented this work and 
brought into focus the ways in which these questions crossed with her 
own life. In ‘The Force of  Circumstance,’ published in the socialist-fem-
inist newsletter Red Rag in 1975, Riley reflected on the ‘conservatizing’ 
effects that being a single mother had on her, even within the context of  
a leftist feminist movement:
It’s struck me that the single mother is effectively voiceless inside the 
Women’s Movement as a whole; that while some good practical work is 
being done by various one-parent-family pressure groups tangential to 
the movement, and was done some years back by women in the claimants’ 
unions — cf  The Unsupported Mothers’  Handbook — at the present we 
aren’t talking as single mothers on any broad basis. At the moment we fit 
in around the cracks in everyone’s theorising like so much polyfilla. I’m 
beginning to feel what I can only describe as the profoundly conservatising 
effect of  being a single mother now. I sense this conservatising on all 
fronts at once; housing, geography, time, work, medicine, sexuality, love. 
(Riley, 1975: 26)2
Continuous from this early piece through her later work is her stub-
born insistence on the affective dimensions of  lived material and ideo-
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logical circumstances, feelings that are not necessarily mitigated by a 
recognition of  their ideological or historical embeddedness. Take ‘the 
housing question,’ for instance:
Everything turns on the housing question as the most visible uniter (‘home’) 
of  structures of  money and class. It’s in respect of  housing that my single 
motherness pushes me back hard into the most overtly conservative 
position. I’d hoped to live more or less communally with people I cared 
for and could work with (without pushing the commune ideology too far; 
mutual support/convenience not necessarily entailing good politics). But I 
never found/co-made such a group. Lacking one, I couldn’t wait; and so I 
filled in such gaps as turned up in peoples’ flats on a need-a-roof-over-my-
and-child’s-head basis, (which many of  us do). In the event we have moved 
seven or eight times in his [her child’s] life-time; most of  those moves I 
didn’t want, but were forced on us as a result of  overcrowding, emotional 
demands from people in a landlord position which couldn’t be met, leases 
expiring, and so forth. The obvious solution to having a child alone is to 
live with people; but there are always a majority who can’t or so far haven’t 
had the massive good fortune of  making it work, who cannot be consoled 
by the diminishing prospect of  true communism. Though we know the 
utter brutal irrationality of  living alone. (Riley, 1975: 26)
In this case, the ‘knowledge’ that her newfound, ‘conservative’ desire for 
private home-ownership and family security is, in part, the result of  a 
lack of  socialized material resources that might otherwise be available 
– or, indeed, fought for – does not lead to any straightforward trans-
formation of  this desire. Riley recognizes the appeal of  prefigurative, 
libertarian-socialist communitarian ideals while feeling their inadequacy 
in the absence of  the material circumstances that would make them truly 
democratic possibilities. We may ‘know the utter brutal irrationality of  
living alone,’ but we may still need and even desire it in the absence of  
other practicable options.
This kind of  autobiographical reflection also shows up in Riley’s po-
etry, albeit in a form that is hardly confessional or expressive in the crude 
sense of  transcribing raw lived ‘experience.’ Consider the following 
poem, from Riley’s 1977 Marxism for Infants:
You have a family ?    It is impermissible.
There is only myself     complete and arched
like a rainbow or an old tree
with gracious arms descending
over the rest of  me who is the young
children in my shelter who grow
up under my leaves and rain
In our own shade
we embrace each other gravely &
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look out tenderly upon the world
seeking only contemporaries
and speech and light, no father.
     (Riley, 1977a: 15)
Here the exigencies of  ‘living alone with children,’ as another poem calls 
it, are worked through in various modes: having a family is impermis-
sible for the single mother, who is not accounted for or celebrated by 
familialist rhetoric. This rhetoric quickly folds into a more general, if  
metaphysical question, namely, whether or not anyone ever has a fam-
ily, or whether, rather, ‘there is only myself.’ But this solipsistic humility 
and caution, whether socially enforced or individually elected, immedi-
ately warps into a set of  stock attributes of  the individual, ‘complete 
and arched’ and then of  motherhood ‘like a rainbow or an old tree/with 
gracious arms descending.’ And then, in another reversal, the ‘complete’ 
I folds over itself, ‘over the rest of  me’ which is, in fact, composed of  
others: ‘who is the young/children in my shelter who grow/up under 
my leaves and rain.’ And so a first-person plural emerges, but not in the 
form of  a celebrated universality; rather, it is the moment of  a conservat-
izing familial-individualism, the notion of  a ‘haven in a heartless world’ 
that many feminists rightly decried:3 ‘In our own shade/we embrace each 
other gravely &/look out tenderly upon the world.’ This grave embrace 
speaks to conservatizing forms of  familialist attachment in the face of  
the force of  circumstance. Yet the hope for other forms of  kinship, based 
on mutual care and respect, remains in the ‘tender’ gaze ‘out ... upon the 
world/seeking only contemporaries/and speech and light, no father.’ I 
have read this poem as a sort of  laboratory or playground for the con-
cerns brought up by ‘The Force of  Circumstance’ and War in the Nursery. 
But Marxism for Infants also opens well beyond the generic borders of  
political theory and personal narrative, into a series of  lyric poems that 
navigate the difficulty of  voicing needs, feelings, or desires through a 
social language and body that are both individuating and alienating: 
postcard;   ‘ I live in silence here
a wet winter   the baby’s well
I give her bear’s names   Ursula
Mischa  Pola   Living alone makes anyone crazy,   especially with children’
I live in silence here
x is the condition of  my silence
s/he
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the tongue as a swan’s neck
full and heavy in the mouth
speech as a sexed thing
the speaking limb is stilled 
    (Riley, 1977a: 6)
The ‘I’ that writes the ‘postcard’ is effectively split and doubled, not only 
in the sense that any ‘I’ is already both mine and anyone’s, but, more 
specifically, in the sense in which the voice of  the ‘mother’ already speaks 
for her children; she is already more and less than one. The apparent 
paradox of  ‘living alone... with children’ rehearses the splitting off  of  
the ‘mother’ from liberal and social-democratic understandings of  citi-
zenship, in which the putative equality of  every ‘I’ effectively erases the 
relationships of  dependence and exploitation that produce the ‘freedom’ 
of  some at the expense of  others (in this case, all those both relegated to 
and excluded from the figural status of  ‘mother’). 
Unlike much of  the feminist poetry that surrounded her in the Wom-
en’s Liberation Movement, however, Riley’s ‘I’ does not break through 
its former silence as some victorious, self-realized entity.4 Silence is not 
experienced as an external force of  repression but rather as a constitu-
tive factor in the production of  language itself: ‘I live in silence here/x 
is the condition of  my silence.’ The sexed silence in which the ‘I’ comes 
to speak is somatized in the form of  non-human prosthetics: ‘the tongue 
as a swan’s neck/full and heavy in the mouth/speech as a sexed thing.’ 
But this kind of  phenomenological investigation is also in tension with 
socialist-feminist aims, insofar as such conspicuously sexed somatization 
can, in the absence of  Riley’s ‘socialized biology,’ also elide the sociality 
of  speech, making speech appear as a matter of  personal hygiene or self-
care, as solely one’s own responsibility, however constitutively exterior 
the ‘self ’ may be. The poem shows how this embedded practice of  indi-
vidualizing sociality, by somatizing speech, can help to account for the 
loneliness of  living with children in the celebrated intersubjectivity of  
motherhood. This poem, then, effectively illustrates the insufficiency of  
an intersubjecive ethics of  social-sexual differentiation or of  personal 
relationships more generally. The mother is at once a single entity asked 
to speak for herself  and the container for an intersubjectivity that is her 
only allowable sociality: the preparation of  the infant for social life. The 
poem protests that sovereign expressions of  feeling in the confessional 
or consciousness-raising mode may only articulate needs that are already 
recognizable as the province of  the imaginary figure of  ‘the mother.’ In 
which case, lyric poetry seems like a curious place to turn in order to ex-
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plore what one single mother’s needs might sound like (if  this is, as I be-
lieve, one of  the things that the volume seeks to do). These are, after all, 
political problems generated well beyond the boundaries of  any ‘I’/’you’ 
relationship, even as they are, significantly, experienced only through in-
terpersonal relationships and personal feelings.
Riley’s work, then, in the tradition of  Marx’s telegraphic theory of  
the ‘social individual’ as developed in his Theses on Feuerbach and the 
Grundrisse (Marx, 1845/2002, 1939/1973), breaks from an understand-
ing of  the social as a sum of  pre-existing intersubjective relations. Marx 
instead urges us to read those relations as expressions, at least in part, 
of  more complex social formations. Marx’s Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach 
reads: ‘Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. 
But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individu-
al. In its reality it is the ensemble of  the social relations.’ This is where, in 
breaking with a particular libertarian feminist aesthetics and ethics, Ri-
ley’s poetry also breaks away from the Arnoldian ideology, still palpable 
today, of  poetry as a prefigurative training ground for social and political 
being: the affects and addresses of  poetry are saturated with social and 
political content, and so it makes no sense to see them as preparatory for 
these arenas. Poetry does not, for Riley, cultivate that primary agency of  
liberal humanist social democracy, the ability to voice one’s needs and re-
spond to the exigent demands of  others, since the voice attributed to the 
social individual would only be readable through what she tantalizingly 
calls a ‘socialized biology’ of  speech. In what follows, I trace the idea of  a 
socialized biology through Riley’s early critical work before undertaking 
a reading of  Marxism for Infants.
‘The Serious Burdens of Love’
The circumstances of  Denise Riley’s life in the 1970s and 1980s led her 
to remark on inadequate housing policies, the loneliness of  bourgeois 
familialism (whether inside or out of  ‘the family’), dwindling nursery 
provisions, and the moral invigilation imposed on ‘unsupported moth-
ers.’ These were never simply problems of  social policy; they were the 
material conditions of  Riley’s life. Born in 1948 in Carlyle, Riley was 
raised as a Protestant by her adoptive parents, who sent her to Catholic 
school.5 Riley enrolled at Oxford to study English, but found herself  
dissatisfied and transferred to Cambridge, where she studied philosophy 
and graduated with a degree in Fine Art. She subsequently did an MA 
and DPhil, both in Philosophy at the University of  Sussex. Her doctoral 
thesis, which turned into War in the Nursery, was on the ‘history of  theo-
ries in European and American child psychology and psychoanalysis ... so 
roughly, in the area of  intellectual history, querying the category of  “ide-
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ology.”’6 Riley lived in Cambridge during much of  this time while raising 
her young children as mother in a one-parent household; childcare was 
never merely an academic question for her. In her remarkable critical 
prose, Riley brings the personal politics of  feminist and libertarian work 
into contact with questions of  political economy and socialist strategy, 
illuminating the social and material components behind personal politics 
without eclipsing the affective intensity that attends them.
Riley’s political outlook in the 1970s developed in conversation with 
the traditions of  Marxist-Leninist organizing and theory, the small 
group approach of  the Women’s Liberation Movement, various forms of  
left libertarianism, and the direct action tactics of  particular campaigns 
such as the Unsupported Mother’s Group. Riley does not fit neatly into 
any of  the categories or schools of  socialist-feminist thought that sur-
rounded her, insofar as she was not a member of  any vanguard party but, 
all the same, did believe in the necessity of  making concrete demands 
upon the welfare state in the hopes of  transforming society and was, in 
this way, rather more in line with Marxism than libertarianism. Riley’s 
primary locus for political action was her work on specific campaigns 
pertaining to reproductive rights and nursery provisions within the 
Women’s Liberation Movement, particularly the Cambridge Women’s 
Liberation Group.7
From the mid- to late-1970s Riley contributed a number of  articles 
to the Cambridge Women’s Liberation Newsletter, ranging from discus-
sions of  ‘A Woman’s Right to Choose’ to the possibility of  a women’s 
self-help therapy group. No work on Riley has engaged with these early 
political writings at all. The closest I have found is an odd chapter of  
Centre and Periphery in Modern British Poetry, in which Andrew Duncan 
has speculated, in an oblique argument against ‘theoretical poetry,’ that 
Riley’s early education in the natural sciences left a mark on her work: 
‘this early phase of  very close observation of  nature (birds and plants) 
left a mark: she has ever since detested generalisations and confusion 
and admired precise recording of  phenomena’ (Duncan, 2005: 94). As a 
result, he argues, Riley ‘never fell for Marx and Freud, but spotted them 
on first reading as authoritarians whose paranoid love of  system-build-
ing had led them away from the sober rules of  evidence ... I don’t think 
she was ever a Marxist ... she was at the libertarian-anarchist end of  
things.’ Duncan sees in this a salutary rejection of  authority, of  political 
lines that proceed purely from theoretical doctrine and from misrepre-
sentations of  consciousness that occlude the truths of  politics as it is 
lived and felt. Duncan’s analysis departs from the poetic work and, more 
disconcertingly, from Riley’s stated positions, to construct a speculative 
politics that has little relation to the actual history of  Riley’s political 
involvement. To call Riley’s political work libertarian is fundamentally 
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incorrect, insofar as it elides Riley’s investments in state institutions and 
forms of  social control and welfare, in their widely variable relations 
of  antagonism and collusion with feminist and socialist aims and cam-
paigns.8 In particular, Duncan ignores Riley’s outright dismay at anar-
chist rejections of  institutions like ‘the state’ or ‘the family.’9 
Duncan is right, though, insofar as Riley does find fault with the 
Marxist tradition from Engels through Lenin and, to a certain extent 
Kollontai and Trotsky, in its assumption that ‘the family’ is a coherent 
entity traceable across its historicization and projected into its future as 
a ‘socialist’ or ‘communist’ family. The socialist family was usually imag-
ined in the utopian or dystopian terms of  heterosexual monogamy (or 
‘individual sex love’) that Engels (1884/1985) championed as one of  the 
moral advances of  women under capitalism, one that would be fully re-
alized and extended to men after the revolution. In an article taking on 
‘Left Critiques of  the Family,’ Riley (1982b: 79) maintains that ‘when one 
adds Engels’ famous pronouncement on women’s liberation [i.e. that it 
could only follow from the participation of  women in public, large-scale 
industry] to his supposition that love and economics stand in a roughly 
superstructure-to-base relationship, then the limits and strengths of  his 
position are clear’. Riley goes on to explain that ‘the historical specificity 
of  family forms, on which Engels usefully insists ... is nevertheless an 
argument which may serve to retain orthodox conceptions of  ‘the family.’ 
In itself  it does not contain any challenge to the idea of  the family as a 
directly cellular unit of  the body politic, a microcosm of  society.’  This 
dialectical critique of  the Marxist treatment of  the family is trenchant 
indeed, but it is a far cry from Duncan’s understanding of  Riley’s focus 
on the family, in which ‘the house is the exact boundary where the natural 
and affective association of  the family comes up against the rational and 
alienated world of  property’ (Duncan, 2005: 93). This reading of  Riley’s 
feminism is, like many understandings of  women’s liberation, unable to 
understand the extent to which housing and the family are already politi-
cal concepts in various dialectical relationships with the ‘world of  prop-
erty.’
There is evidence that Riley was interested in organizational tactics 
drawn from early radical feminist and left libertarian organizing, but she 
never takes these on as adequate substitutes for active engagement in 
class struggle. In the October 1976 issue of  the Cambridge Women’s 
Liberation Newsletter, she contributed to a discussion about the possibil-
ity of  forming a Women’s Self  Help therapy group. Riley (1976) writes, 
rather sheepishly: ‘I am taking a deep breath to say that I’d like there 
to be some sort of  women’s self-help, political/feminist, hmm, therapy 
group’. Riley is quick to demonstrate her distance from the libertarian 
and radical feminist version of  self  help that might ‘conservatively sub-
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stitute Psychology for politics’ and ‘promise instant Joy.’  On the other 
hand, Riley feels that much political organizing represses feelings in the 
name of  a politics that tends to ‘moralistically and repressively reduce 
all individual anxieties to Politics with a monolithic P (or to History, or 
to Alienation) and to expect immediate resolution of  private conflicts in 
political action.’ Riley is characteristically pragmatic and undogmatic in 
her approach to the possibility of  a self-help group, rare qualities amidst 
the bitter debates blustering around her between Marxist-Leninists and 
left libertarians over the appropriate tactics for organizing. She makes no 
blankly anti-authoritarian or messianic claims for collective self-help, but 
neither does she condemn it as a distraction from the ‘real’ work of  party 
building. In the passage that follows, Riley explains how personal politics 
might be addressed at the level of  socialist and feminist organizing:
The personal may ‘be’ the political alright, but the relationship’s fine and 
complex and not one-to-one, e.g. for myself  I can account for continuing 
feelings of  isolation, depression etc, in terms of  ‘it’s all because you live 
with just one person who’s out to work, and you have young children and 
no job which takes you outside the house’ and can analyse that ad infinitum 
in terms of  sex roles, nursery provisions, ideology, capitalism etc.  But 
while this is fine as far as it goes, the most detailed understanding of  the 
sources of  unhappines [sic] need not lead to any increase in your capacity 
to act effectively; - years of  communism and feminism haven’t stopped me 
from literally shaking in a roomful of  people.  It is not that the sources of  
this are mysterious to me; amateur self-psychoanalysis may inform - but 
not change, which is why I’d like there to be a practical group of  some sort, 
if  others would too. (Riley, 1976)
In the proposed scenario, a self-help therapy group would be neither a 
replacement nor a preparation for ‘real’ political work; but neither are her 
own personal anxieties unrelated to racism, capitalism, and heteropatri-
archy or to the organizing required to fight them.This kind of  pragmatic 
approach to organizing is reflected throughout her remarkable essay, 
‘The Serious Burdens of  Love,’ in which Riley revisits the question of  
how feminists and socialists might address child-care as a right and need:
There will be a kind of  eclecticism about formulations on child-care. 
Political thought always, in a way, comes from somewhere else; there’s a 
necessary stitched-togetherness at work, even though the dream of  a pure 
and unique place of  ideals is not to be forgotten in the name of  a modest 
practicable daylight. For, however much history can demonstrate our lack 
of  originality, the recognition of  that need not entail a resentful surrender 
to ‘common sense’ ... You can derive consolation, for instance, from the 
free-floating nature of  the attachments of  socialisms and feminisms to 
psycho-analysis and psychology. The consolations lie in the release from 
having to suppose that there is something necessarily congruent between 
them which has at all costs to be ‘worked out’; and also in taking this very 
supposition of  congruence to have a considerable history and political 
interest in its own right. (Riley, 1987: 188)
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The socialist-feminist desire to articulate and ultimately meet the needs 
of  working mothers through serious social provisions such as child-care 
require a socialist-feminist theory of  what needs are (Riley, 1987: 184), 
but this theory will inevitably run up against its own constitutive em-
beddedness in discourses that exceed and even oppose it.10 No political 
theory (i.e. neither feminism nor socialism) can, Riley insists, cover the 
total field of  human relations without borrowing from other practices 
and frameworks that remain at least somewhat autonomous.11 No amount 
of  theoretical maneuvering can get around this, and Riley insists that 
it is best to acknowledge the necessary impurity of  political theory in 
order to get on with it critically.12
’Developmental psychology; biology and marxism’ takes on such 
problems in the domain of  theories of  socialization.13 Like many of  Ri-
ley’s essays, this is a self-reflexive piece that provides rigorous, dialectical 
accounts of  concepts such as ‘biology,’ ‘the social,’ and ‘the individual.’ 
The essay opens with a statement of  purpose: ‘I want to try to describe 
some conceptual problems concerning the ‘relationship of  biological and 
social factors’, using one particular area, the developmental psychology 
of  children, as a touchstone’ (Riley, 1978: 73). But Riley immediately 
follows this assertion with a rejoinder: ‘my opening sentence has used 
scare-quotes, a pointer to the awkward necessity of  using a terminology 
to discuss its own restrictions.’14
Riley surveys existing models of  accounting for the movement of  the 
‘infant’ from the category of  biological animal to social human. Along 
the way, she seeks to open up the question of  the relations between ‘the 
biological’ and ‘the social,’ calling out the presupposition that each of  
these terms refers to a definite or unified terrain while simultaneously 
recognizing their effective power as abstractions in the world.  Riley’s 
interest in the infant here is as an odd transitional status in the chain 
of  ‘socialization’ and ‘human development,’ two non-identical yet often 
conflated processes. As Riley insists, socialization and the development 
of  intersubjective relations are actually distinct conceptual categories. 
Socialization, or the entry into a totality of  relations, has yet to be ex-
plained by theories of  child development, especially those that look at 
mother-child relations in a vacuum. Riley laments that, within develop-
mental psychology, the ‘“social” is generally understood as synonymous 
with the “interpersonal”, and that within a severely restricted field of  
persons anyway ... That these activities [those of  the mother-child cou-
ple] are read as uninterrupted by the exigencies of  housing, class, etc. 
is to say that “social factors”, anything beyond mere intersubjectivity, 
are unthinkable. Development happens on a terrain of  pure (inter)indi-
viduality’ (Riley, 1978: 75–6). The infant is of  such importance to Riley 
precisely because, while theories of  developmental psychology locate in 
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the vague terrain of  ‘infancy’ or ‘childhood’ the emergence of  human 
sociality, these discourses supposedly about the child always also address 
‘the mother.’ In the chapters of  War in the Nursery that follow, this is 
traced through the ‘popularization’ of  Kleinian-derived theories of  in-
fant psychology, beginning with Melanie Klein’s emphasis on innate and 
pre-Oedipal infantile aggression more or less regardless of  the mother’s 
behavior, to John Bowlby’s theories of  ‘maternal deprivation’ that argued 
for the almost total dependence of  infantile well-being on the attentive 
presence of  the mother.15
Without a working conception of  socialized biology, Riley argues, so-
cialist feminism will fail to understand the complexities of  reproductive 
experience and the ways in which biological, psychological, political, and 
other ideologies work both with and against each other. Riley’s inter-
est in recuperating the category of  the biological for socialist feminist 
thought lies, then, in what she sees as a need for
any historical materialist account of  the individual and society [to] 
include a sense of  the highly specific forms in which ‘biology’ is lived; 
and ... the category of  ‘biologism’ can serve to close off  examination of  
areas that actually crucially need marxist and feminist critical attention.  
These include, for example, reproduction, fertility control, sexuality, child 
development, illness, ageing. (Riley, 1978: 74)
Riley’s claim is that ‘biology is simultaneously biography,’ and that this 
demands a thinking of  ‘biography’ that goes beyond the empirical de-
scription of  experience or the narration of  feelings and of  biology as 
other than a set of  non-ideological facts:
to overlook the particular forms in which biology is lived out is to overlook 
the fact that biology is simultaneously biography. For women in particular 
it is evident that an extremely significant proportion of  ‘social’ experience 
is socialised biology handled in highly specific forms – all reproductive 
experience, for instance – and these forms have at the same time a clear 
political dimension, most obviously for the question of  the conditions for 
a real control of  fertility and for the possible real content of  slogans like 
‘sexual self-determination’. (Riley, 1978: 89)
In Riley’s feminist socialized biology, ‘all reproductive experience’ must 
be read in conjunction with specific social and political rhetorics, policies, 
and campaigns. It remains, however, somewhat unclear exactly what the 
writing of  this socialized biology looks like: it is my contention in this 
essay that it takes partial form in the poetry that Riley was concurrently 
writing.16
a note on sex
I will turn here to a consideration of  the poetry that Riley was writing 
alongside the papers that led to War in the Nursery. Riley’s first volume 
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of  poetry, in which the poems quoted above were published, was Marxism 
for Infants, published in 1977 by Wendy Mulford’s press, Street Editions, 
as a small-release staple-bound volume. The collection begins, of  course, 
with its title, framed explicitly in relation to the questions of  the repro-
duction of  relations of  production that animated much Marxist-feminist 
political thought. The title is taken from George Orwell’s The Road to 
Wigan Pier, in which a fictional ‘Comrade X,’ a bourgeois socialist, au-
thors a volume called Marxism for Infants all the while remaining marked 
by the ‘training of  his childhood, when he was taught to hate, fear, and 
despise the working class’ (Orwell, 1958: 135–6). At her first ever public 
reading of  poetry (a joint reading with Wendy Mulford at the 1977 Cam-
bridge Poetry Festival), Riley explained that the title was in fact only 
unconsciously drawn from Orwell:
’I’d thought of  the title for myself, but Wendy pointed it out that I hadn’t, 
and it’s a submerged memory of  what Orwell says in The Road to Wigan 
Pier, and I’ll read the way Orwell uses the title, I suppose because it’s so 
much ... he sells it short in a way; it’s such a lovely phrase and he uses it 
very undialectically ... I wanted to retrieve that and use it, I suppose to 
say that if  Marxism does not have to do with infants and vice versa then 
there’s not much hope for either infants or for Marxism.’ (Riley, 1977b)
Riley’s version of  the title also points to the persistence of  conservative 
feeling in the very effort to ‘retrain’ consciousness via a moral and cultur-
al indoctrination in early education. The adoption of  this title is at least 
doubly ironic in light of  Orwell’s own pro-natalist writings from the 
1940s that Riley quotes at length in War in the Nursery.17 Riley’s title also 
harbors reservations about the political purchase of  her own relatively 
‘academic’ socialist-feminist poetry, given its limited and rarefied circula-
tion.18 Finally, the title riffs on Orwell’s suggestion that a socialist would 
demand some sort of  swamp be made between Marxism and infants – in 
other words, bourgeois intellectuals might exchange their Marxism for 
rearing children, or perhaps, according to a eugenicist logic, the working 
classes should give up on having children and embrace Marxism instead. 
Riley, for her part, will have none of  this.
Calling itself  a sort of  handbook, then, Riley’s sequence of  nineteen 
poems is nonetheless hardly didactic; it is accented, rather, by moments 
of  doubt and uncertainty. The lexicon flickers with the concerns of  the 
time, as the discursive materials drawn from feminist and Marxist politi-
cal praxis are disorganized and reorganized, echoing each other through 
sound patterning, an unconventional use of  the page, and complex slip-
pages between the third-person pronoun ‘she,’ the first-person ‘I,’ and an 
impersonal, generalized ‘you.’ From the opening poem, ‘A Note on Sex 
and the Reclaiming of  Language,’ Marxism for Infants calls into question 
lyric and feminist reclamations of  an authentic voice, all the while insist-
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ing on the necessity of  grammatical personhood developed alongside a 
constant disruption of  lyric address with more impersonal elements.  ‘A 
Note on “Sex”’ has generally been read as a key to Riley’s early work, 
and it does indeed prefigure the political philosophy of  language that she 
developed later in Am I That Name: Feminism and the Category of  ‘Women’  
in History (1988):
a note on sex and the reclaiming of  language
The Savage is flying back home from the New Country
in native-style dress with a baggage of  sensibility
to gaze on the ancestral plains with the myths thought up
and dreamed in her kitchens as guides
        She will be discovered
as meaning is flocking densely around the words seeking a way
any way in between the gaps,    like a fertilisation
        The work is
e.g. to write  ‘she’  and for that to be a statement
of  fact only and not a strong image 
of  everything which is not-you,    which sees you
The new land is colonised,    though its prospects are empty
The Savage weeps as landing at the airport
she is asked to buy wood carvings,   which represent herself
      (Riley, 1977a: 1)
This poem has been read by critics as a relatively straightforward po-
lemical allegory for the misrecognitions of  categorical identifications 
and interpellations. Unlike most of  Marxism for Infants, ‘A Note on Sex’ 
works within a restricted thematic, lexical and syntactic range and sus-
tains an extended conceit of  the ‘Savage’ as a critique of  radical femi-
nist injunctions for women to ‘reclaim the language.’19 Riley is obviously 
skeptical of  this possibility; in all of  her work, language has us as much as 
we can ever dream of  having it.20 Self-descriptions are always, for Riley, 
appropriable to ends against one’s needs and wishes (’mother’ being her 
early test case), not because we name ourselves incorrectly but because 
language is radically privative. Hence the attempts of  the ‘Savage’ to es-
cape colonization by returning ‘home,’ in ‘native-style dress,’ are readily 
commodified and sold back to her for a profit. Some of  Riley’s contem-
poraries seem to have altogether missed this irony, reading the volume 
as attempting to ‘reclaim the language.’ In a 1977 review published in 
Perfect Bound, Peter Robinson (1977: 85) insists that the volume earnestly 
believes this to be a desirable goal, and finds fault with the volume for 
its absence of  the ‘male pronoun:’ ‘Until the man can be reintroduced 
upon terms that are more evenly distributed the reclaiming of  language 
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remains a formulation defined in the terms of  a now absent male orienta-
tion from which the language has been reclaimed’.
Riley’s more avowedly feminist readers have also tended to read this 
poem as an attempt to ‘reclaim the language,’ but they have also more 
readily recognized the poem as an allegorical ironization of  any such ef-
fort. Linda Kinnahan reads in the poem an attempt to voice ‘the female ‘I’ 
outside of  dominant norms’: 
Just as public myths enter the domestic kitchen ‘as guides,’ the private 
woman is neither separate from nor immune to the systematic othering of  
the ‘feminine’ within private, public, historical, and literary spheres ... The 
language of  the poem, in evoking various narratives, seeks an alternative 
for the ‘she’ to the cultural representations available to her and suggests 
that the meaning ‘flocking densely around the words seeking a way/ any 
way in between the gaps’ occurs not through mimetic means but through 
the ‘gaps’ made apparent when seemingly disparate narratives (travel, 
domestic, imperial) are brought together and their interconnections 
foregrounded. (Kinnahan, 2004: 211–12)
Kinnahan sees the poem, and Riley’s work more generally, as enacting 
a primarily negative movement of  refusal while retaining the hope that 
the truth may come through the ‘gaps’ between different discourses, each 
of  which is in itself  too overdetermined. Frances Presley (1999) reads 
the poem, and Marxism for Infants more generally, along similar lines: ‘in 
Riley’s feminism and her language it is easier to say what a woman is not, 
and it is much more dangerous to start saying what she is’. Romana Huk 
has read the poem’s ironic manipulation of  a naturalizing language of  
sexuality as evidence of  Riley’s critique of  radical feminist affirmations 
of  the ‘feminine’:
‘Sex’ as gendered essence is thus de-naturalised by the poem’s parodic 
naturalisation of  the relentless and inevitable process of  linguistic 
construction of  selfhood - all of  which issued, when the poem appeared 
twenty years ago, a potent early critique of  romanticised projects in the 
female construction of  identity. (Huk, 1997: 241)
Carol Watts (2000: 159) has also argued of  Riley’s early poetry more 
generally that ‘it is easier ... to see what is being broken from than broken 
towards’.
Each of  these readings helps to explain what is happening in ‘A Note 
on Sex.’ But too exclusive a focus on this poem and on its relationship to 
a more or less schematized version of  her 1988 book ‘Am I That Name’: 
Feminism and the Category of  ‘Women’  in History has tended to obscure 
what is happening in the remainder of  Marxism for Infants and the vol-
ume’s relationship to the political and historical writings that Riley was 
concurrently working on. For example, Presley is able to argue that the 
title of  Marxism for Infants ‘is undercut by the poems which follow in 
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which the infants are her own, and what she has to teach them has far 
more to do with feminism and feminist linguistics, than with Marxism.’ 
This is a somewhat unhelpful distinction, not only insofar as Riley’s po-
litical milieu was working through the connections between Marxism 
and feminism, but also because the poetry itself  works in and at this 
connection through its concentration on the ‘socialized biology’ of  ‘the 
mother’s’ voice.
In other words, ‘A Note on Sex’ does prefigure Riley’s later turn to a 
feminist philosophy of  language, but it does not exhaust the range of  
affects and relations to language, space, voice, and body that are explored 
throughout the remainder of  Marxism for Infants. This is not only be-
cause other poems broach different subject matter; they are also formally 
quite different. The other poems I have read above represent another 
tendency among the poems of  Marxism for Infants: the first type of  poem, 
exemplified by ‘A Note on Sex,’ is a relatively self-contained lyric artifact. 
Few of  the poems that follow it really stand on their own in the same 
way, which may explain their relatively minimal presence in Riley’s 2000 
Selected Poems, published by Reality Street, which focuses much more on 
the poems from the 1993 collection mop mop georgette. The majority of  
the poems in Marxism for Infants do not lend themselves to being read as 
individual poems; they are more numbers in a series best read in quick 
succession. Indeed, almost all of  these poems are untitled in Marxism 
for Infants, but a number of  these are provided with titles when they 
reappear in the 1985 collection Dry Air. Although the distinction I am 
drawing between stand-alone lyric and verse sequence is contestable, I 
think it can help to illuminate part of  what is happening in the collection 
and to provide a corrective to the reception of  this work, which has for 
the most part been read according to a model better suited to the short, 
self-contained lyric poem.21 In the Cambridge Women’s Liberation Newslet-
ter of  July 1976, Ruth Craft in reporting on a meeting of  the ‘Women 
and Writing Group’ noted that ‘Denise would like to attempt a sustained 
work but, for example, finds conventional third-person narrative an im-
possibility’ I would argue that Marxism for Infants is such a work, even 
though the poems that comprise it were written over a number of  years. 
Indeed, when Riley read the work at the Cambridge Poetry Festival, she 
introduced it as a single poem: ‘I want to read a poem of  mine that goes 
on for fifteen minutes. It’s called Marxism for Infants.’ I will refer to the 
sections of  the poem as individual poems themselves, but they operate 
both alone on the page and as part of  a single serialized piece.
The serialized quality of  this work is relevant to the argument I am 
making about Riley’s socialized biology. To the extent that Marxism for 
Infants is a ‘sustained work,’ its shape is not reducible to the bounded, for-
mal management of  feeling and perception that is often attributed, how-
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ever spuriously, to the successfully autonomous lyric poem. In this way, 
the poems are not miniaturized encapsulations of  the political theory 
discursively elaborated in the prose; they are, rather, leaky echo chambers 
in which political and personal discourse are bounced across and through 
each other. Carol Watts (2000: 160) usefully argues that, in the poems of  
Marxism for Infants that suggestively figure language in domestic terms, 
‘the lyric form is unravelled as topography ... If  the house is synonymous 
with the self, as in the poetry of  Emily Dickinson, it cannot escape its 
gendered coding: domesticity, hearth, shelter, prison, tomb’. I would ex-
tend Watts’ comments by arguing that, in Marxism for Infants, the walls 
of  that great house of  lyric autonomy are also porous; each poem reflects 
an essayistic writing of  the social individual captured and recaptured in 
the contradictions and complicities of  political and personal language, 
each attempt echoing pieces of  the others such that none can possibly 
contain the problem in the wholeness of  a single lyric. 
‘is it enough like this as I am’
I would draw two main themes and formal operations from what I’m call-
ing the ‘second kind’ of  poem: (1) the dislocation of  voice and of  bodily 
proprioception, amounting to a querying of  how one lives the biological 
and social as biography – as the writing of  life – through lyric address and 
versification, sound patterning, echoing; and (2) the address to another, 
you, who is perceived only through the above series of  dislocating ma-
neuvers. The way in which these two strands are formally linked and dis-
persed shows a very different management of  lyric from that proposed 
by or analyzed by the Practical Criticism; the poems work cumulatively 
by extending ‘the fine steely wires that run’ not only ‘between love and 
economics’ (as a poem from No Fee has it) but also through and around 
want, need, rights, speech, sex, voice, biology, and individuation. In what 
follows, I read the remainder of  Marxism for Infants in light of  the mate-
rials I’ve covered so far, considering how Riley’s poetic text works on the 
analytics of  socialized biology toward which her critical work insistently 
gestures.  As I’ve suggested, Riley’s notion of  a ‘socialized biology’ re-
mains primarily gestural in War in the Nursery. I believe that this reflects 
the necessity, for Riley, of  thinking this notion through the language 
of  first and second-person lyrical subjectivity. That is, the biology that 
Riley seeks to understand is only accessible through the personal and 
vocative registers of  lyric poetry as a socialized biography or writing of  
life. This means that there can only be an aporetic relationship between 
‘socialized biology’ as a theoretical or discursive category and its enacting 
in lyric as a biographical praxis. This tension will accompany all of  my 
readings of  the poems: each time that I attempt to read them theoretical-
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ly as expressions or developments of  ‘socialized biology,’ I risk appearing 
as though I don’t notice the ineradicable difference between these poems 
and the discourses of  biology or sociology. But this seems to be an una-
voidable foolishness preferable to not noticing the ways in which Riley’s 
poetic and theoretical works actively supplement one another to write 
the sociality of  biology ‘as it is lived.’
Like ‘A Note on Sex,’ the remainder of  Marxism for Infants does not 
adhere to the epistemological claims of  consciousness raising, as Claire 
Buck notes in her essay on ‘Poetry and the Women’s Movement in Post-
war Britain’ (1996) but neither does any ‘Marxism’ get transmitted to 
any ‘Infants’ through some sort of  Leninist ‘training-’ or ‘instruction-’ 
based political education (or, for that matter, through the authority of  
a mother or father who knows best). Rather, the political and personal 
materials are circulated through prosody, and subjectivity is voiced in the 
echoes of  intimate and political addresses. The fourth poem reads:
says I’m into cooking now
says I’m into taoism
absorbed by a shifting of  bright globes serially
You have a family, then? No.
mothers       hospitals
sex        class         housing
anchored           flying
is it enough like this as I am
is the human visible through above &
completely in the material determinants
         up
I cannot understand the function of  the
living body
except by enacting it myself
and except in so far as I am a body
which rises towards the world    (Riley, 1977a: 4)
The sound patterning of  the middle section of  this poem (beginning 
with ‘mothers’ and ending with ‘up’) shifts from an emphasis on ‘o’ and 
‘s’ (mothers hospitals sex class housing) to ‘s’ and ‘i’ in ‘is it enough like 
this as I am.’ The effect is such that while ‘Anchored’/’flying’ would be a 
simple opposition without the work of  sound patterning that leads up to 
it, the -ing that links ‘housing’ to flying calls into question the ‘anchored’ 
status of  the former.
Finally the ‘n’ and ‘m’ phonemes gains dominance, with ‘i’ remaining in 
the mix by the underscoring of  ‘in’ such that ‘the material determinants’ 
closes this image-complex without any sonic or orthographic surprises, 
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subtly echoing the question about how ‘I am.’ But then ‘up’ oddly irrupts 
in a hiccupped syllable with the ‘p’ phoneme which has not appeared at all 
in the densely alliterative poem thus far. A British hiccough might better 
echo the ‘enough,’ but this is precisely not what happens, we are not ‘off ’ 
but ‘up,’ in a moment that signals a decisive turn in a poem that already 
seems quite vertiginous enough. This ‘up’ also points ‘above’ the mate-
rial determinants sonically and semantically rather than ‘in’ or ‘through’ 
them, to the above of  the superstructure of  ‘culture.’ But this performa-
tive ‘up’ also points back to the beginning of  the poem on the page and 
back to the names of  those material determinants themselves. And it is 
also perhaps ‘up’ as in ‘time’s up.’
The question remains, however: ‘is it enough like this as I am’ – it, this, 
and I linked in a question, this is as I am, but is it enough like this. It and 
I are crossed like anchored and flying, and what I am is woven into the 
elements that precede and ‘house’ it. The first moments of  this poem are, 
let’s recall, a sort of  anonymous reported speech: ‘says      I’m into cook-
ing now/says     I’m into Taoism’ seem to have introduced the ‘I’ into the 
poem as a quotation from a third person, echoing the impersonality of  all 
strategies for meeting externally defined personal needs.  But is this, is it, 
am I, enough?  Is this impersonality of  the subjective ‘I,’ is its sociality 
enough, even if  the ‘I’ is socialized and therefore never a self-contained 
sovereign agency?
The effect of  the crossing of  it, I, and this is such that when we return 
to the ‘I’ in the final stanza, what ‘I am’ (a body) is an ‘it’ I enact, suggest-
ing that the speaking and enacting ‘I,’ the subject of  enunciation, is itself  
something that is enacted. This final stanza consists of  a sentence taken 
directly from Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of  Perception (1945/2002), 
a philosophical work that greatly impressed Riley. The sentence nar-
rates the paradoxical experience of  the body simultaneously as object 
and subject of  perception. Each of  these frameworks, the objective and 
the subjective, elides the other, but it is only in and as this shifting back 
and forth that any understanding must take its place. This is what cannot 
be understood of  or by the living (socialized) body, namely, its needs and 
desires, at least not when society and biology, subject and object, are un-
derstood as discrete regions of  experience, however mutually ‘interact-
ing’ they may be. But this theoretical statement cannot explain the poem 
that includes it; it is also affected by the jolt of  the poem’s spacing (‘up’) 
and the lines that precede it. The only possibility for knowledge is a ris-
ing of  the (biological) body not above the (social) world but towards it. In 
this way the ‘up’ transforms and is transformed by the end of  the poem, 
as are all of  the ‘material determinants’ and the theories that would seek 
to name them. 
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The poem on the next page traces another topography of  the body 
in speech, recalling Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2002: 87–102) account of  
phantom-limbs in its efforts to understand the I/you relationship in 
terms not reducible to an interior/exterior dichotomy:
the speaking,   the desire to be heard
the hearing,   the desire to be told
tongues piece the joints of  scattered limbs
click lubricants of  social grace
‘articulacy’ articulates
a flow,   a dazzling mass
the speaking,   the desire to hear
the hearing,   the desire to be spoken
is thus sweet   massy   a diffused
glowing extension
to you   (shaking)
to you   (absence) 
     (Riley, 1977: 5)
This poem moves between two interconnected experiences of  direct ad-
dress: speaking so as to be heard and hearing to be told are followed by 
speaking as ‘the desire to hear’ and hearing so as ‘to be spoken.’ The first, 
in which ‘tongues piece the joints of  scattered limbs /click lubricants of  
social grace’ works, through such clicking articulation (and one can hear 
in the hard consonants of  ‘click lubricants’ the socially graceful clucking 
of  tongues) to articulate ‘a flow,   a dazzling mass’ that quickly turns into 
a less venerated tradition of  speech. ‘The desire to be spoken /is thus 
sweet   massy   a diffused /glowing extension /to you’: here the glow of  
desire is diffused and extended like a phantom limb that neither excludes 
nor wholly encompasses ‘you.’
Jonathan Culler has argued that apostrophe, the figure of  speech in 
which some inanimate or absent person or thing is addressed as if  present 
and capable of  responding, is a feature of  all lyric rather than a special 
case (Culler, 1981). This is so, according to Culler, insofar as lyric works 
in vocative modes to produce textual events rather than merely to repre-
sent events extrinsic to the action of  the poem. For Culler (1981: 149), 
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apostrophe has ‘a special temporality which is the set of  all moments 
at which writing can say “now”’, and this temporality is foundational to 
lyric as a genre or mode of  discourse; the vocative call to another is the 
very stuff  of  lyric poetry.  Culler further suggests that 
one distinguish two forces in poetry, the narrative and the apostrophic ... 
Nothing need happen in an apostrophic poem ... because the poem itself  
is to be the happening ... Apostrophes remov[e] the opposition between 
presence and absence from empirical time and locat[e] it in a discursive 
time. The temporal movement from A to B, internalized by apostrophe, 
becomes a reversible alternation between A’ and B’: a play of  presence and 
absence governed not by time but by poetic power. (Culler, 1981: 149–50)
Taking into account the hyperbolic, fictional power of  apostrophe as 
outlined by Culler, the ‘I’ and ‘you’ of  lyric address cannot be reduced 
to empirical intersubjective discourse. ‘I’ remains, rather, an inanimate 
linguistic personhood that has no authority except in relation to a ‘you’ 
that it animates in order to be animated by it. It is this discursive time 
of  address that conditions the lyric power to produce a textual event, as 
Culler suggests all apostrophe does. On its own, Riley’s poem reads as 
an enactment of  this deconstructive movement of  apostrophe. But here 
I would protest that reading this poem as an application of  Culler’s writ-
ings misses the particular social staging of  lyric address in Riley’s work.
Barbara Johnson’s essay on ‘Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion’ 
brings Culler’s theory of  apostrophe into an encounter with sociopo-
litical debates about abortion, showing how the ‘poetic power’ of  apos-
trophe can have analogous effects in the (real) ‘world of  difference’ 
(Johnson, 1987). For Johnson, apostrophe can function to animate an-
other who will, in turn, animate the first speaker (as in the case of  the 
unborn ‘child’ whose imagined ability to be addressed and to respond 
lends the pro-life apostropher a considerable degree of  authority). John-
son has exposed the extent to which apostrophe, as figure, carries with it 
social contradictions far beyond the scope of  an abstracted ‘I’ and ‘you.’ 
This sociality of  lyric is signaled, in Riley’s work, not merely by the ap-
pearance of  the word ‘social’ in the text but, as the poems work together 
to show, and as no single poem can quite demonstrate on its own, this 
sociality is constitutively built into the body and voice, as ‘the desire to 
hear’ or ‘be heard’ obviously comes before and stays beyond the hearing 
of  any individual utterance.
Apostrophe’s performative power works in this way against itself, ef-
fectively destabilizing any empirical temporality of  the speaking subject 
and infecting it with the sociality latent in the mother /child dyad; as 
Johnson (1987: 192) asks: ‘who, in the final analysis, exists by addressing 
whom?’ Indeed, the chiasmus of  ‘the speaking, the desire to hear /the 
hearing, the desire to be spoken’ inverts the primacy of  presence to self  
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via a speaking to the other who is to animate the self ’s own mouth. ‘My’ 
voice in this poem comes from ‘your’ mouth, but you are not just anyone; 
voice is experienced as a phantom limb, a diffused and massy ‘extension/ 
to you’ who are an absent and shaking linguistic person. The love poem 
is thus inflected by Riley’s social inscription of  motherhood from the 
other poems. The tripping movement across imagined and real borders 
between ‘I’ and ‘you’ is not reducible to the stance of  a ‘self ’ in relation to 
some ‘other,’ as in the ethics of  intersubjectivity; they are already soaked 
in the socialized biology of  speech as they are lived. Once again, Riley’s 
work considered as a whole insists that socialization cannot be reduced 
to intersubjectivity.
This model of  speech is more fully elaborated in the antepenultimate 
poem in the volume, in which speech is narrated in the third person, the 
objective experience of  the body as a set of  objects: 
A woman’s head occupying the whole depth;   a white ground.
Her head turning and the voice and the voice beginning.
The hand reaching,  brushing slowly across the mouth and
       withdrawing,   thus describing an arc.
The voice repeating a phrase which the mouth shapes.
The mouth and the hand together encircling the words.
This impulse renewed over and over again. 
      (Riley, 1977a: 17)
This poem traces the emergence of  ‘voice’ as a phenomenological cat-
egory terminating and originating in repetition (’renewed over and over 
again’). The poem’s third person narration allegorizes the exteriorizing 
and objectifying nature of  theorizing the body in impersonal terms. The 
body in question is marked as a feminine impersonality, alternating be-
tween the definite and feminine possessive articles (’A woman’s head’ and 
‘her head’ interspersed with ‘the voice,’ ‘the mouth and the hand’). The 
poem traces a movement from subjective experience to objective appear-
ance, beginning with the attempt to perceive a total immersion in subjec-
tivity: ‘A woman’s head occupying the whole depth,’ and then the parts 
of  the body that enact speech are parcelled out as objects, primarily hand 
and mouth. These are the agencies of  speech as the body attempts to 
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form and shape a language that in fact gives it form: ‘The voice repeating 
a word which the mouth shapes./ The mouth and hand together encir-
cling the words.’ Finally, ‘This impulse renewed over and over again,’ an 
impulse to speak coming from outside the hands but within the world 
of  the woman’s head, in which language gives contour to the hand and 
mouth within the total field of  the ‘woman’s head’ that it simultaneously 
constitutes. There is no mention, in this poem, of  ‘you,’ but the condi-
tions for any address are shaped by this constitutive exteriority and iter-
ability of  ‘the voice.’22
A few pages earlier, the fourteenth poem brings ‘you’ into this dy-
namic, narrating the affective intensity that both ‘you’ and ‘I’ have felt 
upon meeting ‘people in rooms... /... burning... /& alight with eagerness 
and almost touch /& stay the night here and yes!’ The poem is breathless, 
briefly cathecting on different objects of  promise as it passes between 
each ‘particular/ whatever ... /that shone to the eye immediately’, includ-
ing ‘your’ own face in the mirror:
you’ve met I’ve met people in rooms before
we’ve gone into rooms burning with our own
          rightness for now
& alight with eagerness and almost touch
& stay the night here and yes!   the blazing
ever-realised vividness of  that particular
whatever  -  stone postcard slow scarlet of
a paperback’s creased edge sharp corner
of  soap & at the mirror your face outdated
since you are already gone on ahead of  it
to this on which you are embarked & goodbye
to your opened face as you turn
back to the lit room seriously  -  anyway
that shone to the eye immediately
before
touch
    (Riley, 1977: 14)
The first words of  the poem assert a continuity between ‘you’ and ‘I’ 
(’you’ve met I’ve met people in rooms before’), the vagueness of  the verb 
and predicate forcing a recognition that indeed ‘you’ and ‘I’ have both 
had this same experience. The distinction between you and I is then dis-
solved in the next line into we: ‘we’ve gone into rooms burning with 
our own/ rightness for now,’ which might have been a bit harder to get 
‘you’ to ascertain had the stage not already been set for ‘our’ conflation. 
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The next few lines speed up with the casualness of  opening ampersands 
echoed in the ‘ands’ that follow later in each line, the internal rhyme of  
‘rightness’/’alight’/’night,’ and the consonance of  ‘s’ and ‘t’ repeating 
(’eagerness and almost touch/ & stay’). The opening affirmation cul-
minates with ‘& stay the night here and yes!’ after which the poem is 
slowed down by ‘the blazing/ ever-realised vividness of  that particular/ 
whatever–’ ‘whatever’ dulling the ‘vividness’ that the poem subsequently 
attempts to articulate. The next lines’ relative lack of  punctuation and 
abundant enjambment make them read quickly, if  not exactly ‘vividly:’ 
‘stone postcard slow scarlet of/ a paperback’s creased edge sharp corner/ 
of  soap & at the mirror .... ’ And right here, between these vivid objects 
and the room ‘alight’ with promise is ‘your face outdated.’ Once again 
‘you’ is the impersonal you, directed to anyone listening and more or less 
interchangeable with ‘I’: ‘& at the mirror your face outdated/ since you 
are already gone on ahead of  it /to this on which you are embarked ....’ 
Here the lyric subject is, like the reader, burdened by its own necessary 
retroactivity, as ‘you’ are/’I’ am already past as we turn toward another 
person or object, and you experience this redoubling of  self-presence by 
reading the poem’s addresses. At this point the poem gathers speed: ‘since 
you are already gone on ahead of  it’ might almost be a sequence of  dac-
tylic tetrameter, depending on whether or not the ‘you’ is impersonal and 
unstressed or apostrophic and stressed. This is followed by the metrically 
irregular and overly grammatical ‘to this on which you are embarked ...’ 
and then a departure from this encounter with your anachronistic face 
and from the regular meter that led away from it: ‘goodbye/ to your 
opened face as you turn/ back to the lit room seriously.’ The high-speed 
intensity of  these lines is rhetorically disregarded or dismissed by an 
‘anyway:’ ‘anyway / that [i.e. ‘that particular whatever’] shone to the eye 
immediately ...’. All of  this has taken place ‘before/ touch,’ and so the 
‘touch’ of  a prospective lover emerges both as animus and endpoint to 
the ‘vividness’ of  each ‘particular whatever,’ much as it haunts the face in 
the mirror throughout. The touch of  sex is thoroughly interspersed with 
the self-regard that it both faces and follows after (in the double sense of  
‘before’). This interplay of  conversational and ecstatic tones reappears in 
the second-half  of  the sixteenth poem, after three shorter stanzas, the 
first composed in vocative and almost mystical lyric, the second listing 
fragmented figurations of  some undefined entity, and the third a single 
line further juxtaposing coolness with emotion:
hold fast in arms before astonished eyes
whom you must grasp throughout great changes
constant and receptive as a capital city
is now a fire  now a frozen hand
a rainstorm  white birds
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a rotting log  a young boy
a savaged sheep an indifference
a kind of  seriousness,    a kind of  rage
and through each transforming
yourself  to be not here whose
body shapes a hundred lights a 
glowing strip of  absence night’s
noisy and particular who
vanishes with that flawless sense
of  occasion I guess you’d have if
only I knew you at first light
leaving   ‘the wrong body’ ,    old,  known 
     (Riley, 1977: 16)
The stanzas diverge in structure and tone, but there are some clear 
continuities between them. Beginning with the first line, there are un-
mistakable, if  rather unexpected, echoes of  ‘Dreams,’ an early poem by 
Langston Hughes (1994: 32): ‘Hold fast to dreams/ For if  dreams die/ 
Life is a broken-winged bird/ That cannot fly// Hold fast to dreams/ 
For when dreams go /Life is a barren field/ Frozen with snow’. Not only 
are the opening words of  each poem the same, but each first line shares 
an end rhyme (die/eyes), and meter (iambic tetrameter). Moreover, the 
‘white birds’ and ‘frozen hand’ in Riley’s second stanza take on a new sig-
nificance in light of  this intertext, echoing as they do the barren fields of  
Hughes’s dreamless dreamland. Hughes’ injunction to dream within the 
context of  U.S. racial oppression and economic exploitation positioned 
the sovereignty of  imagination ambivalently between escapist fantasy 
and revolutionary force. Riley’s second stanza ends with ‘an indifference,’ 
terminating the ‘great changes’ in Hughes’ bleak, affectless landscape 
that threatens to neutralize the charge of  the antitheses that precede it 
(fire or frozen, mineral or animal, rotting or young). But the grammar 
of  Riley’s first stanza is ambiguous:  in the second line, does ‘whom’ cor-
respond to the ‘eyes’ or to whatever one must ‘hold fast in arms’ (perhaps 
a dream?) before the eyes?  What is being modified by ‘constant and recep-
tive as a capital city?’  Is it paradoxically the ‘great changes’ from the pre-
vious line? There is no punctuation to help us here, and the second stanza 
only produces more ambiguity: what exactly is ‘now a fire,’ etc.? On what 
object are these figural transformations enacted?The challenge of  the 
poem lies in its demand that this otherness without place, this thing that 
must be held or must hold ‘fast in arms,’ must also somehow survive 
and be survived. The final stanza speeds up again into that rapturous, 
breathless lyric stream that we saw in the fourteenth poem, lacking punc-
tuation and replete with enjambment and suggestions of  regular meter 
(the almost trochaic tetrameter and rhymes of  ‘whose /BOdy SHAPES 
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a HUNdred LIGHTS a /GLOWing STRIP of  ABsence NIGHT’S ... ’). 
Again the poem is primarily addressed to an impersonal you who could 
also be an ‘I’ or a ‘one’: ‘and through each transforming/ yourself  to be 
not here.’ This otherness can only be elsewhere, somewhere other than 
this lonely anonymous capital cityscape ‘whose/ body shapes a hundred 
lights,’ and ‘you’ are one who, like the capital city, ‘vanishes.’ Still, the 
location of  this otherness in transformation is unclear – indeed, the very 
occasion of  its /your transformation is unknowable since we don’t know 
whose or what entity’s ‘wrong body’ is being transformed or left behind 
in the first place: ‘with that flawless sense /of  occasion I guess you’d have 
if  /only I knew you at first light /leaving “the wrong body .... ”’   This 
‘old,   known’ body, however, was never known or even dreamed by the 
speaker. Here Riley takes on the problem of  knowing the affective strug-
gles of  anyone else.  ‘The forces of  circumstance’ that guide anyone else 
seem to be ‘a frozen hand... an indifference’ to me.  This attempt to know 
and to feel anyone else’s life will be the standard to which so much of  
Riley’s later poetry will hold itself.  For my purposes, it is worth noting 
the movement from the assertion of  indifference to the rapturous lyric 
of  the final stanza.  Although the poem ends by recognizing the inability 
to know from what interpellation another person has struggled to break 
away, the lines that immediately precede it bespeak a passionate and com-
passionate movement that burns with more ‘rightness’ than the doubt 
that surrounds it. 
I will close by reading the tenth poem from Marxism for Infants, in 
which Riley narrates a less bleak dreamscape, albeit one that all the same 
‘looks impossible.’ This poem is quite distinct from the rest of  the collec-
tion in that it reads as perfectly grammatical (if  imperfectly punctuated) 
prose.  It is one of  few poems in the volume other than ‘A Note on Sex’ 
to feature a sustained conceit and to provide a seemingly straightforward 
narrative account.  This very short story recounts an attempt to move 
from one unlikely domestic setting, presumably brought on by the force 
of  circumstance, to something willed and genuinely chosen:
I lived with my children in a warm bright and
harmonious room which formed the crest of  a high
timber scaffolding   -   a room on stilts.   Outside
it was a black night,   an old railway yard,
abandoned tracks,    a high wind.  Our room
although too small for our needs was glowing and 
secure despite the fact that it had no roof,
that its walls led straight upwards to the 
black clear sky.
 I left there briefly and encountered x
who pointed upwards to show where we should both
go.   A smooth platform hung in the sky,   its
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only access a long swaying cord joined to its 
midpoint,    the end of  which drifted against my
face.   It looked impossible but I was not
disheartened.
      (Riley, 1977: 10)
The first stanza provides a surreal portrait of  a sort of  squat: the sur-
roundings are ‘old’ and ‘abandoned,’ and the atmosphere, following the 
pathetic fallacy that is perhaps all that can be seen from within the ‘grave 
embrace’ of  the family, is a ‘black night’ with ‘high wind.’  The room is 
both removed from and a part of  this world: it is ‘a room on stilts’ yet 
has ‘no roof.’  This housing report vacillates between pointing out the 
shabbiness of  the squat and emphasizing its miraculous sufficiency: this 
is the dream of  the family always being enough even as it is wide open 
to and propped up by ‘the outside’ that simultaneously abandons it to 
itself.  Thus the room, ‘although too small for our needs’ and ‘despite the 
fact that it had no roof ’ appears ‘glowing and secure,’ ‘warm, bright, and 
harmonious.’  The poem does not simply demystify the bourgeois com-
forts of  security and harmony; they are presented as part of  the same 
fantasmatic reality that extends ‘upwards to the/ black clear sky.’ 
At this point the poem shifts to its second act, in which the speaker 
recounts having ‘left there briefly.’ What transpires is an encounter with 
‘x,’ an ambiguously authoritative figure who suggests ‘where we should 
both/ go.’ The ‘impossible’ architecture that follows ends the poem am-
bivalently. If  ‘it looked impossible,’ then why is the speaker not disheart-
ened? Is it because she is plucky and believes that with effort she will 
succeed? Or, alternately, because she does not want to leave with x at 
all but would prefer to remain in the roofless house? Should we read the 
speaker as intentionally withholding the reason for her perseverance? 
Or, reporting a dream, is she merely recounting an affective state with-
out any understanding of  its cause? The poem leaves these questions 
suspended, and in this way invites the reader to speculate on the affective 
dimensions of  housing and the as-yet-inscrutable nature of  the needs of  
single mothers within a regime of  the figure of  the mother as vessel of  
intersubjectivity.
Like much of  Marxism for Infants, then, this poem lays bare a range of  
affects and experiences for the reader’s attention. This is not, however, 
because these poems invite the reader to imitate the lyric subject or to find 
moral integrity by censuring her. Rather, Marxism for Infants traces the 
production of  speech through the matrix of  its embodied inscriptions. 
Lyric address, as the purportedly ethical management of  otherness, is 
shown to be coeval with and implicated in the institutional (linguistic, 
ideological, and repressive) discourses of  the capitalist nation-state. But 
what these poems bring to the surface is the way in which wants and 
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needs are, all the same, constantly produced within and through this ma-
trix, written onto and out of  the socialized body: and they will continue 
to be so even after any revolution. ‘Real’ needs and wants are recuperable 
for struggle only through their rehearsed expression, only through re-
peated, partial attempts to share them with ‘you.’ This is the socialized bi-
ology of  Riley’s lyric, which cannot be produced in expository discourse 
but only in the vocative registers of  a lyric that simultaneously decries 
the myth of  a pre-political, ethical realm of  pure intersubjectivity.  So no, 
it is not enough like this as I am, but it will even more certainly never be 
enough as long as all that passes before touch is consigned to the realm 
of  the ethical, of  pure intersubjectivity, of  some mother’s good sense to 
develop herself  into the psychology of  a fantasmatic child.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Andrea Brady, Emma Heaney, Nisha Kunte, David Lloyd, and Shaol-
ing Ma for support and advice as I researched; Hannah Westall at the Girton 
College Archive, Cambridge University was especially helpful. Peggy Kamuf, 
Neil Pattison, and Jessica Stites read earlier drafts and provided invaluable sug-
gestions for revision.
Notes
1 Riley suggested as much in a private conversation with me in August, 2010.
2 By the time of  Am I That Name, Riley had come to question the gesture 
of  repairing voicelessness through speaking ‘as’ any particular identity or 
sociological category (Riley, 1988).
3 Cf. Barrett and McIntosh (1982) for a trenchant critique of  Christopher 
Lasch’s Haven in a Heartless World (1977).
4 Cf. Collections of  British feminist poetry such as Fell et al. (1978), Mohin 
(1979) and Roberts and Wandor (1977).
5 See ‘Waiting’ (Riley, 1993b) for a chillingly elliptical account of  Riley’s early 
family life and schooling.
6 Email correspondence, 9/22/2010.
7 The group was not University based, although many of  its members were 
affiliated in one way or another.
8 That is, Riley was not one to demand the immediate dissolution of  the state. 
Left-libertarian socialist feminism certainly did exist, but Riley was hardly 
one of  its proponents. See Lynne Segal’s contribution to Beyond the Frag-
ments (Rowbotham et al., 1979) for a canonical expression of  left-libertarian 
feminism.
9 I read Duncan’s seemingly idiosyncratic gloss of  Riley’s politics as a 
symptom of  a more widespread ignorance of  the history of  the women’s 
liberation movement and particularly of  its relationship to socialism. The 
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literary left seems particularly unaware of  the fact that the women’s libera-
tion movement argued for decades over the nature of  the capitalist state 
and whether and how to integrate feminist, anti-racist, and anti-imperialist 
demands into contemporary tactics of  class struggle.
10 For example, the imbrication of  contraceptive provisions with eugenic dis-
courses or more generally of  the welfare state with biopolitical forms of  
discipline and control.
11 In this her work is a far cry from her contemporaries’ attempts to create ‘uni-
fied’ theories of  capitalist patriarchy. See Eisenstein (1979) and Voge, (1983) 
for such attempts, and Barrett for a trenchant critique of  both ‘unified’ and 
‘dual systems’ approaches to understanding the relations between capitalism 
and women’s oppression.
12 As she writes in War in the Nursery: ‘I take it that it’s necessary both to 
stress the non-self-evident nature of  need and the intricacies of  its determi-
nants, and also to act politically as if  needs could be met, or at least met half-
way. The benign if  traditionally unimaginative face of  ‘socialist planning’, 
is, at the least, preferable to its known alternatives, however much its objects 
will always tend to be in excess of  it and slip away’ (Riley, 1983: 193–4). 
Likewise, Riley is always scrupulous in indexing her understanding of  the 
necessity for single-issue defensive slogans and reform campaigns (such as 
‘a woman’s right to choose’) even as she recognizes the practical limits and 
metaphysical impossibilities of  this liberal language of  choice: ‘The right 
to choose’ must imply the right to choose to have (not merely not to have) 
children; and this right is a very metaphysical assertion in a situation where 
provisions for the myriad needs for bringing up those children in a humane 
way are thin on the ground. And, of  course, conspicuously thinner for some 
than for others. To follow through the ‘positive’ aspect of  the right to choose 
would entail a many-faceted campaign, a generalizing of  the issue, which 
linked it to a wider context of  agitation for the reforms necessary to give 
more plausibility to the notion of  choice. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be 
wrong to criticize an essentially defensive slogan, so heavily marked by its 
necessary strategical locations, on the grounds of  its incompleteness’ (Riley, 
1982a: 191). Riley here refuses to stop short of  opening to analysis the con-
nections between these different questions of  social policy, highlighting the 
affective tangles from which they are inextricable, and understanding the 
movements of  these discourses and ideologies both with and against their 
explanation in a simple economic base.
13 The essay was revised from its original 1975 version for publication in the 
journal Ideology & Consciousness and was rewritten again as chapter two 
of  War in the Nursery.
14 Her anxiety and shrewdness regarding the limitations of  criticizing theo-
retical presuppositions while using their own terms is reminiscent of  Louis 
Althusser’s early writings on Marx (Althusser, 1965/2005). Riley’s essay is 
littered with such skeptical gestures, most notably (and most notably fol-
lowing Althusser) in her querying of  ‘spatial metaphors’ such as those of  
Journal of British and Irish Innovative Poetry | 05_02 | 2013
196
‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ in Marxist philosophy and historical materialist 
methodology.
15 According to Riley, the common socialist-feminist account of  Bowlbyism at 
the time of  her writing saw it as instrumental in reconfiguring policies on 
childcare after the war. Riley herself  contests this received wisdom, dem-
onstrating that the timing didn’t work out in quite this way, and that ‘the 
state’ never worked as a single entity in concert with psychoanalysis. Rather, 
this particular narrative is, she argues, a back-formation of  the 1950s, and 
the closure of  wartime nurseries also had to do with many other ideological 
formations, most notably those surrounding the ‘mother’ as a separate entity 
from the woman worker (though these could be collapsed for the sake of  
expediency to correspond with the necessity for temporary women’s work in 
munitions). These ideological formations, she argues, predated and extended 
far beyond the reach of  developmental psychology, and they were often to be 
found in avowedly socialist and feminist discourses.
16 The above passage also indicates Riley’s ongoing interest in slogans as effec-
tive agents in the world worthy of  analysis not only on the level of  signifi-
cation but also of  distribution and effects. For Riley, rhetoric is perhaps the 
central stumbling block for political analysis; neither ideological struggle 
nor materialist correctives are sufficiently able to understand the workings 
of  rhetoric. The explicit lesson from War in the Nursery, then, is that the 
gaps between intention, speech act, and effect need to be respected and held 
apart even as they bleed into each other. On the power of  pronatalist rheto-
ric: ‘Rhetoric doesn’t make women have more children through the sheer 
power of  the word – the word narrowly conceived. Its presence matters, 
though, to put it mildly, and has to be assessed, irrespective of  whether it 
‘works’ in the most detectable sense’ (Riley, 1983: 151-2). The way in which 
the ‘presence’ of  rhetoric and language ‘matters’ and ‘works’ is a source of  
continual curiosity for Riley, in her prose and in her poetry.
17 Orwell writes: ‘the birth rate ... is not likely to rise to the replacement level 
until those in power, as well as the ordinary people in the street, come to feel 
that children matter more than money’ (1971: 49–50; cited in Riley, 1983: 
156).
18 Thomas Butler argues this last point at more length in Writing at the Edge 
of  the Person (2005).
19 Most readers have taken the title as a directive to read ‘savage’ only as a 
metaphor for ‘women.’ At least one reader has questioned the racist and im-
perialist overtones of  this figuration, insofar as it is used for the deconstruc-
tion of  gendered rather than racialized discourse: ‘The co-optation of  the 
metaphors to a feminist project, which does not yet specifically engage race, 
is problematic because the conflation of  gender and race denies the specific-
ity of  the colonial experience. But because this language does not reappear 
elsewhere in Riley’s work, its use in her poem is arguably part of  her critique. 
Nonetheless, Riley never makes this criticism explicit through the theoreti-
cal discourse of  the poem in the way that she does with gender, so that the 
enactment of  the gesture of  cooptation within ‘a note on sex’ verges un-
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comfortably on a repetition of  the colonization process.’ (Buck, 1996: 95–6) 
I would argue that the poem actively engages the intersection of  gender and 
colonial race, insofar as inverts the troping of  land/Savage as woman.
20 In this way Riley’s work echoes that of  one of  her favorite poets, W. S. Gra-
ham. Riley’s poems are particularly reminiscent of  Graham’s Implements 
in Their Places, which was published in 1977, the same year as Marxism 
for Infants, although this influence is much more pronounced in the later 
poems from mop mop georgette and in the philosophical works The Words 
of  Selves and Impersonal Passion. Two of  Graham’s titles from Implements 
will schematically serve to indicate these resonances for now: ‘What is the 
Language Using us for?’ and ‘Language Ah Now You Have Me.’ 
21 Watts being an exception to this general tendency.
22 Riley consistently explores this thinking of  lyric address and subjectivity 
through the work of  Merleau-Ponty. Another poem directly quotes Phenom-
enology of  Perception (Ponty, 1945/2002: 97) and then tacks on two addi-
tional lines (Riley, 1977: 11).
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